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Social networks of influence in Europe – 
and beyond
Dieter Plehwe
The transatlantic financial crisis has led to a backlash against European 
democracy. Even if the previous efforts to increase participation remained 
quite limited (Quittkat, 2011: 653-674; Hüller, 2010: 77-107), there had 
been a clear emphasis on strengthening supra-national and trans-
national democracy in Europe up until around 2008. Enhanced NGO 
participation, citizen initiatives and online consultations reached out to 
social groups not normally involved in supra-national policy-making. 
After 2008 however, austerity policies were imposed by regimes outside 
the community framework, pitting rich States against poor States and 
reviving old centre-periphery notions and constitutionalising inequality. It 
is not entirely wrong to blame these developments on the Schäuble model, 
or, previously, that of Tietmayer (as argued by Bourdieu, 1998). The 
“dangerous idea of austerity” (Blyth, 2013) has certainly been promoted 
by Germany’s treasury and the Bundesbank. Lids on budget deficits, an 
eye to a maximum level on public debt and low inflation are trademarks of 
German supply-side economics and stealth neo-mercantilism.
But simply blaming Germany does not answer important questions 
relating to structural and ideational change, which in fact does not rest 
within national borders. And with regards to this, we need to ask a number 
of questions. Where did the ideas, which have strangled Europe for quite 
some time now, come from? And why do influential circles in many EU 
Member States support these ideas, rather than call for a united opposition 
to German austerity leadership? Why do so many neighbouring countries 
defy calls for solidarity in the refugee crisis, rather than asking for a quid 
pro quo deal on public finance and crisis management? Why has Europe 
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seemingly become stuck on notions of neo-liberalism and nationalism, 
eventually paving the way for Brexit?
In this essay, I will argue that the once, more dominant frame of 
European inter-governmentalism is indeed misleading and inadequate 
in explaining the transnational rise of neo-liberal ideas behind much 
of the recent orientation of European integration. In order to explain 
this paradigm shift, we have to pay more attention to cross border elite 
networks, which have been involved in important controversies regarding 
European integration.
The competing European integration framework of neo-functionalism 
has always emphasised the role of elites in European integration 
processes, but scholars working in this tradition were exclusively focused 
on pro-European elites. The trajectory of integration, spill over, or more 
integration, never considered competing elites with different orientations. 
Elites were naively perceived as being in favour of Europe, not against it. 
In order to comprehend the recent struggles over the future of Europe, 
we have to disentangle this allegedly homogeneous social class, to make 
visible competing political elites.
Serious competition has emerged to the traditional mainstream elite 
perspective of an ever-closer union. The roots of this opposition are not 
nationalist, as one might think, in light of the also growing opposition 
from Le Pen and friends. The roots of ‘limited integration’, or ‘economic 
integration only’-elites, can rather be traced back to organised neo-liberal 
circles that already opposed important aspects of the European project in 
the early days of the Treaty of Rome. The 1980s moved European integration 
and globalisation a good deal closer to ideals of free market capitalism. 
But the prospect of economic and monetary union followed by political 
union, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and German unification, 
reinvigorated neo-liberal opposition to deeper integration. Instead of the 
inter-State federalism, which Hayek had envisioned, already back in 1939 
(Hayek, 1980 [1948]: 255–72), a centralised supra-national State – political 
union – seemed to be on the horizon. From Maastricht onward, European 
networks of organised neo-liberals mobilised to intervene in European 
debates in unprecedented ways.
We can trace some of the trails of the groups involved in the formation 
of neo-liberal perspectives back to the Mont Pèlerin Society and related 
think tank networks. The Mont Pèlerin Society was founded, amongst 
others, by Friedrich August von Hayek and Wilhelm Röpke in 1947, to start 
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competing with Socialist and Social Liberal (‘Collectivist’) convictions 
in particular, but also to work against certain strands of Conservatism. 
Hayek’s reflections on the competitive implications of inter-State 
federalism has been credited, by Wolfgang Streeck (2014), for much of 
Europe’s development. But Hayek’s ideas did not play such a big role in 
Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, which begs the question, why they took 
on such a major role from the 1990s onwards (Höpner&Schäfer, 2012: 
429–55).
Mont Pèlerin’s neo-liberal Europe:  
From opposition to ambivalence to partial disintegration 
(never closer union!)
Hayek had in mind the model of the Fabian Society when he called a 
number of ideologically close colleagues and friends to convene in the Swiss 
Alps in 1947. The Fabian elite socialists developed a reformist programme 
of social reform in the late 19th century. Instead of entering party politics, 
public debate and politics at large, Fabians preferred to devote their effort 
to research, and to channel their findings and interpretations to powerful 
decision-makers.
From a liberal perspective, the 1930s were a dramatic, if not traumatic 
period. The Great Depression, Soviet rule in Russia and Nazi rule in 
Germany, were all not promising in terms of the prospect of global market 
Liberalism. Concerned circles of intellectuals were invited to Paris in 
1938 in the framework of the League of Nations intellectual committees 
to discuss Walter Lippmann’s book ‘The good society’. At the Walter 
Lippmann meeting, participants which included Hayek, Mises and Röpke 
agreed on the need for a new programme in the face of (a) the failure 
of traditional Liberalism and (b) the rise of Collectivism, a lose category 
designed to capture all perceived enemies of the market and individuals 
on the Left and the Right. This programme was given the name “neo-
liberal” (Denord, 2009: 45-67).
Critics of neo-liberalism frequently overlook the first part of the 
mission: addressing the weaknesses of classical Liberalism, which 
had perceived market capitalism as a natural, self-stabilising order. 
Neo-liberals instead recognised the need to secure market-capitalism, 
and ventured to compete with others ideologies on what kind of future 
direction social orders should take. For neo-liberals, it was clear that 
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market capitalism was preferable to alternative perspectives of mixed or 
planned economies. But the statement of aims of the Mont Pèlerin Society 
embraced social minimum standards “not inimical to initiative and the 
functioning of the market”, and aimed at redefining “the functions of the 
State so as to distinguish more clearly between the totalitarian and the 
liberal order” (Hartwell, 1995: 41-42), making clear that the State should 
be in support of freedom (of contract), property rights and individualism. 
Democracy, on the other hand, was notably absent from the core of the 
neo-liberal programme. In any case, neo-liberals were, and are, looking 
for public policies that suit their project, not naïve supporters of pure or 
free markets, no matter how important this slogan became in the fight 
against the welfare state.
Already in the 1930s, participating scholars were to join forces in 
think tank offices in different countries, including in the UK, France, 
Switzerland and the U.S. The war intercepted this effort, which was taken 
up again by Röpke and Hayek when they allied after World War II to found 
the Mont Pèlerin Society. Much like the Fabians, Mont Pèlerin members 
did not directly seek political influence. They focused on internal debates 
and networking on the basis of shared norms and principled beliefs, 
like property rights, individualism, rule of law, and an adherence to 
absolute values in religious and philosophically idealist traditions. The 
values and principled beliefs of neo-liberalism have subsequently been 
constantly reproduced and applied to concrete fields in many discussions 
of the Mont Pèlerin Society conferences. For public purposes, many Mont 
Pèlerin members helped directing and staffing neo-liberal think tanks, 
like the Institute of Economic Affairs in the UK, and the Foundation of 
Economic Education and the American Enterprise Institute in the U.S., 
as well as the Aktionsgemeinschaft Soziale Marktwirtschaft in Germany 
(compare Walpen, 2004). The Mont Pèlerin Society meetings and think 
tank activities in turn were supported by a broad range of businesses 
and corporate foundations. Neo-liberalism was not created by business 
interests, but there clearly has been an elective affinity between neo-
liberals and certain business perspectives from the very beginning. More 
importantly, Mont Pèlerin and think tank venues secured the interrelation 
of academic, business, media and policy making circles. The conscious 
networking across fields and domains provided neo-liberal networks 
with interdisciplinary and inter-professional competencies, which have 
undoubtedly proved very useful in exercising influence in policy arenas 
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and political circles. Operating in a mode “between network and complex 
organisation” (Plehwe&Walpen, 2006: 27-70), Mont Pèlerin searched for 
and directed efforts at developing alternatives to modern welfare state 
capitalism.
Ironically, a publication of the Fabian Society was early to observe the 
development of considerable intellectual capacities and new orientations 
challenging the mainstream in public debate emanating from Mont 
Pèlerin related circles:
“Hardly a week goes by without some conference of teachers, social workers or 
medical men being told that, for economic reasons, consumers must be charged 
directly for welfare services [...] Bits and pieces of the New Right’s doctrine 
appear in various places, from the writings of Enoch Powell or the Bow Group to 
the propaganda of Aims of Industry, but it is most coherently expressed in the 
publications of the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA). The IEA’s output has been 
considerable.” (Collard, 1968: 1)
Collard pointed to the systematic publishing activities of the neo-liberal 
think tanks and warned the Progressive movements as early as 1968(!) of 
the rise of a new social force:
“My own rather dif ferent worry is that the Left is being successfully outflanked 
by the New Right. While we argue about possible (marginal) extensions of public 
ownership the really important hard core of the present public sector (health, 
education and other social services) is being undermined. We are now at the 
beginning of a series of major assaults on the welfare services and rather than 
foraging around in the private sector we should look to our defences.” (Collard, 
1968: 5)
From defence to offence and flexible response:  
Neo-liberal ambivalence with regard to Europe
Between 1959 and 1987, Europe’s economic and social policy was torn 
between the protection of mixed economies, public services, industrial 
policies and agriculture on the one hand, and the drive to remove obstacles 
to cross-border economic integration. Up until the 1980s, harmonisation 
played a considerable role as a perceived precondition of successful 
integration. From then on, the emphasis was on ‘negative’, rather than 
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‘positive’ integration, on deregulation and liberalisation, rather than 
harmonisation and convergence.
One member of the Mont Pèlerin Society, Fritz Machlup, an Austrian 
economist who had been forced to emigrate to the U.S. in the 1930s from 
his native Austria (like von Mises, Haberler and von Hayek), gave much 
time to studying the basic meaning of ‘integration’. Confronted with 
notions of political integration in Europe, he delved into the history of 
economic integration, pointing to the necessity for the removal of obstacles 
(negative integration), rather than harmonisation, coherent regulation, 
or structural funds etc. (positive integration) (Machlup, 1977). Not only 
was he able to counter the dominant notion of political integration on 
this basis, he also refined the neo-liberal counter-proposal: economic 
integration requires the commitment to the removal of obstacles of all 
kinds, including political obstacles like public enterprise, regulatory 
competencies, non-tariff barriers, etc. And Europe was only a regional 
part of a larger task: the neo-liberal perspective on integration was global. 
‘Cosmopolitan capitalism’, as Herbert Giersch wrote in 1989, on the eve 
of the post-Socialist expansion of the capitalist order (Giersch, 1989: 1-16).
Both Social Democratic and Conservative ideas of regulated capitalism 
eventually came under siege by neo-liberal ideas of deregulated or ‘free 
market’ capitalism across borders. Machlup’s preceding intellectual 
efforts to develop a competitive notion of integration on behalf of neo-
liberal strategies went unnoticed, by and large, until it attained relevance 
in the single market project of the 1980s and important court decisions 
like the Cassis de Dijon case of 1979. EU Commissioner Davignon proposed 
trade policy based on this ruling, which essentially required the removal 
of non-tariff trade barriers (like diverging consumer protections standards 
etc.). In economics, Mont Pèlerin member and president from 1986-
1988, Herbert Giersch’s analysis of ‘Eurosclerosis’ added momentum to 
the negative integration pathway chosen in the 1980s (Giersch, 1985). In 
political science, Fritz Scharpf’s work on the negative integration bias of 
Europe seemed to validate the inevitability of European neo-liberalism. 
With hindsight, Fritz Machlup’s historical investigation suddenly seemed 
to matter a lot.
But the collapse of the Soviet Union and German unification changed 
the terms of the debate again. The EU Commission president Jacque 
Delors jumped on the occasion to pursue a more ambitious agenda of 
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economic, monetary and political union, which turned out to be highly 
divisive. Progressives blamed the Maastricht Treaty as a major turn to 
neo-liberalism because it would for the first time institutionalise austerity 
criteria in an international treaty for the European members of monetary 
union. Overlooked by many, right wing neo-liberals (like Herbert Giersch, 
and a letter writing community of economists) also attacked the Maastricht 
Treaty because the criteria were considered soft, and difficult to enforce. 
In addition to such economic criticism of Maastricht, the ‘British’ Euro-
sceptics formed in even stronger opposition to political union.
1990s: Neo-liberals move on and to Brussels
All those who are interested in Europe remember the famous Bruges 
speech, delivered by Margaret Thatcher, the founding event of the Bruges 
Group against an ever-closer union. Neo-liberal civil society networks had 
not mobilised many resources in Brussels before the 1990s, but did now 
with a vengeance. The Bruges Group started a considerable publishing 
activity of policy papers against many aspects of integration. Its Manifesto 
for Europe, of Europeans against technocratic rule from Brussels, attracted 
600 signatures from Euro-sceptic academics. When the convention 
process was started to debate a political constitution, neo-liberals from 
across Europe pulled together the European constitutional group headed 
by Professor Christian Kirchner, a public choice economist from Berlin. 
In 1993 the network contributed a neo-liberal draft constitution to the 
process. The following members joined in the writing: Peter Bernholz 
(Switzerland); Francisco Cabrillo (Spain); Gert Dahlmanns (Germany); 
Jacques Garello (France); Henri Lepage (France); Angelo M. Petroni (Italy); 
Joachim Rückert (Germany); Frank Vibert (Great Britain); Peter Stein 
(Sweden); Pascal Salin (France).
The group included seven members of the Mont Pèlerin Society. It 
remained active after the collapse of the constitutional process. An open 
letter of the group (in modified composition), to the head of the European 
Council, Donald Tusk, in 2015 (dated December 1), opposed measures to 
increase solidarity across borders and presented yet another agenda for a 
limited Europe.
Around 2008-2010, an interruption in the neo-liberal networks occurred. 
For example, the Stockholm network, which had connected more than 100 
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think tanks, ceased activity in 2010. A major reason for this development 
– apart from the global financial crisis – was the formation of the Alliance 
of European Conservatives and Reformists, led by the British Tories and 
other right-wing parties from Poland and the Czech Republic (Vaclav 
Claus, a Mont Pèlerin member), among others. Its founding document, 
the Prague Declaration, states a clear neo-liberal programme for Europe, 
a blueprint for partial disintegration. The language is mostly Euro-sceptic. 
The only positive reference is the expressed desire for equality of Member 
States, big and small, as would be expressed by any good federalist.
The new party alliance opposed the collaboration of Conservatives and 
Socialists in the EP, and aimed at creating centre-right-wing majorities 
against deeper integration. Many activities of neo-liberal civil society 
networks now moved closer to established European party politics. AECR 
forged a new neo-liberal think tank network under the umbrella of the 
party foundation New Directions (Plehwe&Schlögl, 2014), which combines 
many former Stockholm network members. Brexit will certainly weaken 
the political party coalition of the AECR, but the Cameron wing of the 
Tories have already established their own ‘open Europe’ think tank, which 
operates with offices in London, Brussels and Berlin. Think tanks, in fact, 
are much less restricted with regard to their partners and affiliations than 
political parties, and can be considered extremely valuable in maintaining 
ties and promoting specific ideas and projects across parties and world-
views. It still remains to be seen if Brexit will weaken neo-liberal 
perspectives. Neo-liberal networks are deeply entrenched in the various 
nations across the EU.
Opposing deeper integration, defending the status quo  of 
corporate globalisation, losing Europe
Neo-liberal circles have been one of many competing social forces in the 
process of European integration. Their influence has always been relative. 
In the beginning of the European integration odyssey, the circles of Jean 
Monnet were arguably quite a bit stronger than the neo-liberal opposition. 
Neo-liberal perspectives gained influence in the 1980s, against a backdrop 
of the crisis of Fordism and a welfare state model plagued by rising 
unemployment, increasing expenses and public debt. The neo-liberal 
transformation of the welfare state has since become the mainstream in 
the age of “permanent austerity” (Paul Pierson).
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With regard to the EU, the picture of the 1990s is more complicated: 
neo-liberals advanced in terms of deregulation, cross border liberalisation 
and the supply-side oriented austerity. But European integration also 
expanded in areas of environmental, social and labour market policies, 
much to the dislike of the friends of negative integration. Fighting these 
developments, European neo-liberals have now become more political in 
the framework of the European Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists 
and their New Direction foundation. Their programme is best understood 
as a prospect of partial disintegration, a limited EU that is imagined to 
come closer again to neo-liberal ideals.
Readers may still doubt that neo-liberals actually exist, since few are 
willing to officially embrace the label. But thankfully, Sam Bowman of 
the Adam Smith Institute recently declared a ‘coming-out’ of neo-liberals, 
which included the following (incomplete) positive list of essentials, 
notably excluding any reference to democracy, just as in the statement of 





5. Empirical and open-minded
6. Globalist in outlook
7. Optimistic about the future
8. Focused on changing the world for the better
(Bowman, 2016)
Unlike in 1947, social minimum standards are also notably absent, let 
alone notions of social citizenship. The paradoxical effect of the permanent 
neo-liberal hammering on the EU and the welfare state has of course 
helped the rise of neo-nationalist tendencies, culminating in Brexit, and 
Le Pen and Frauke Petry ante portas. This is the choice neo-liberals, and all 
Europeans face: promote neo-liberalism and move Europe ever closer to 
the brink of disintegration, or reconsider the scope of integration. Victims 
of globalised ‘free market’ capitalism look for protection. If workers and 
employees do not, or cannot, organise trade unions, they will get a Donald. 
Social security may be framed as an exclusive right of legitimate members 
of the Nation State, protected from outsiders and others that do not belong. 
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Or social citizenship may be considered solidarity of inhabitants of a 
social space shared by all who live together and need solidarity in order 
to tackle the problems and issues that result from common economic, 
political, ecological and other challenges, not least from the now extremely 
burdensome heritage of neo-liberal orders.
Neo-liberals united on the basis of common norms and principled 
beliefs back in the inter-war and post-war periods, which provided them 
orientation in their effort to organise across borders, which they aim to 
maintain to control people, but not capital. Progressives have been lost 
in national varieties of capitalism, welfare states and so on, instead of 
developing a competitive base across borders. The Left, in fact, has much 
to learn from the right-wing efforts to organise and coordinate across 
borders. Paradoxically, the Right has become the international party. Can 
the Left overcome its parochial inclinations?
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